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Three recent books on Nepal's development offer
enlightening if varying interpretations of why poverty
persists for the vast majority of Nepal's citizens after
more than forty years of development efforts. Two of
the books, P.P. Karan and Hiroshi Ishii's Nepal:
Development and Change in a Landlocked
Himalayan Kingdom, and Narayan Khadka's
Foreign Aid, Poverty, and Stagnation in
Nepal, are empirical studies, overflowing with
statistics and full of references, while Dar Bahadur
Bista's book Fatalism and Development is an
essay which synthesizes his years as a scholar and
observer of Nepal, but never cites most of its
bibliographical entries. All three books agree that
development efforts have failed, and all three blame that
failure on a combination of Nepal's harsh geography,
the legacy of pre-1950 exploitation by a small elite, and
the ineffective operation of the post-1950 government.
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They differ in the relative emphases they give to these
interacting forces and in the explanations they provide
for the poor performance of the modernizing
governments that have directed Nepal since 1951.
The most comprehensive of these books is that by
Karan and Ishii, Nepal: Development and
Change in a Landlocked Himalayan Kingdom.
Here we have a broad overview of Nepal's development
efforts and achievements between 1950 and 1990. The
book is filled with data in tabular and mapped form and
has an excellent 65x110 em pullout map of Nepal
included. Paul Karan has been studying Nepal since the
1950s when he synthesized the few existing government
statistics, data he personally collected, and the hand-held
air photos he had taken to prepare the first overview of
Nepalese resources for UNDP (Karan, 1960). The
current book makes excellent use of the tremendous
increase in information that scholars have gathered since
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that time, though the authors feel still more data are
needed. The book is a collaborative effort with
contributions by Masao Kobayashi, Chakramehr
Vajracharya, Mohan Shrestha and David Zurick.
The authors lament Nepal's persistent poverty,
which they attribute to the country's disadvantaged
geography, to the legacy of Rana exploitation, and to
the institutional failings of government administration.
Nepal's geography and Rana exploitation have created
extremely difficult problems for His Majesty's
Government (HMO) to overcome. Yet, in the years
since 1951 HMO has also failed to rise to the
challenges. History cannot be changed, so the Rana
legacy receives the least attention. Nor, of course, can
geography be changed, yet because it defines the
possibilities and the limits, the book devotes most of
its attention to defining Nepal's geographical resources.
In contrast, since public administration can be changed,
the authors include throughout the book considerable
information about the planning process and the
programs of the various ministries. In the introductory
and, especially, in the concluding chapters they
recommend what HMO must do to push Nepal forward
on the path to development.
The geographical focus of the book is evident in the
chapter titles and contents. The first chapter,
"Introduction to a Landlocked Kingdom," gives a
statistical synopsis of Nepal's current status as one of
the "least developed countries," provides an overview of
Nepal's political-economic history, briefly reviews the
history of development policy since 1951, and explains
the implications of being landlocked. Not only is most
of the country so rugged that little land is cultivable and
transportation extremely difficult, but the landlocked
position gives India decisive control over Nepal's
economy. The lack of industrial natural resources forces
Nepal to import them from or through India, and this
adds enough transport costs to make industrial
competition with India impossible. Further, the ability
of India to strangle surface imports and exports,
demonstrated most recently in the 1989 border closings
(the stress of which Karan and Ishii feel triggered the
political reforms of 1990), means that Nepal cannot
adopt any policy which India opposes.
The second chapter describes the physical
environment and natural resource base by describing the
geo-ecological zones, the climate patterns, the water
resources, and the mineral deposits. It concludes with a
discussion of natural resource management issues.
Chapter 3 reviews the information on land use,
forest cover, and related environmental problems. None
of the recent land use assessments has provided the level
of detail needed for comprehensive planning; the
existing theories of land management are designed for
developed low land countries. Existing data do show
that forest area in the uplands has decreased little since
1950s, but forest density and condition have
deteriorated. In contrast, Tarai forests have decreased by
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25%. The chapter gives a good summary of forest
management history and issues, approvingly discusses
the post-1977 efforts to implement Community
Forestry and identifies the local and institutional
impediments to its implementation. The chapter
concludes with recommendations of how HMO can
improve forest management: improve general welfare
and income levels; increase local control over forests so
"forest users" will benefit from forest improvement;
introduce rural employment programs through which
forestry products are produced and marketed; reorient the
forestry bureaucracy to promote community forestry and
gain the trust of villagers.
Chapter 4 evaluates agricultural development. The
authors first review the various measurements/estimates
of cultivated land. They then discuss the major crops
and cropping systems. Agriculture, while the mainstay
of 80% of the population, has performed poorly, with
little or no gains in productivity. National increases in
production have come from converting Tarai forests to
farms, and this increase has barely kept up with
population growth. Land distribution statistics show
that 63% of the households own less than 1 ha and
these holdings sum to only 10.6% of cultivated land.
Land reform has failed, with some estimates suggesting
45% of the people are functionally landless.
Government programs have done little to re-distribute
land or promote the investments which raise yields.
Increased production in the Tarai is also more likely to
go to India than to the hills.
Chapter 5, "Human Resources," discusses
population growth and migration. The authors see rapid
population growth as a major problem. They relate this
growth to poor government health care, to inadequate
extension services for birth control technologies, and to
the low status of women. The book also gives an
overview of migration, both temporary wage-labor
seeking migration and permanent migration within
Nepal and to other countries. Chapter 6 outlines
cultural patterns and concludes Nepal is much more like
a "salad bowl" than a melting pot.
Chapter 7 is a detailed discussion of settlement types
and urbanization during the last 40 years. Chapter 8
describes Nepal's industrialization process historically
and provides a wealth of information. The ninth chapter
describes the transportation system and trade; again we
find a rich historical overview. Chapter 10, "Tourism,"
provides a detailed discussion of tourism development,
emphasizing the history, economic potential, the social
and environmental impacts.
The final chapter, "Development Challenges,"
argues that Nepal must meet three major challenges.
The first is to implement a development plan which
improves the welfare of the majority and maintains the
ecological foundations of the economy and society.
Planners can accomplish this goal by reforming policies
based on the following axioms: prices set by the
government must reflect the real value of resources;
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regulations governing bureaucrat behavior must be
enforced~ government workers need to be trained
adequately and given incentives to follow policy
decisions; local people have to be given power to
participate in development planning and to manage the
resources they use.
The second challenge is to integrate poverty
alleviation programs with development strategies.
People need jobs and the country needs greater
productivity. Both of these problems can be resolved
by using development funds to hire people to do
projects which increase the productivity of the economy
and maintain environmental integrity. Local people
must participate in identifying, planning, and evaluating
these projects; examples include irrigation,
afforestation, soil conservation, health care.
Bureaucratic ineptitude and "corruption" can be
eliminated by reforms, though change will be slow.
HMG planners must provide a plan which establishes
Nepalese goals and coordinates the efforts of the many
bilateral, multilateral and NGOs now operating.
The third challenge is to integrate population control
programs into the entire development ~ffort. ~he
demographic transition has psychological, social,
economic, technological, and institutional roots. Birth
control must be easily accessible locally, and must be
free; low caste groups need educational and employment
opportunities; women and girls need education; health
care must be available to reduce infant mortality.
In short, to explain the failure of the modernizing
governments of the post-1951 years, Karan and Ishii
adopt an "institutional" explanation, i.e., the
institutions of HMG need reform: HMG hasn't yet got
the planning process functioning properly; there are too
few government workers and they are inadequately
trained; bureaucratic regulations are not enforced and
incentive systems do not reward professional
competence and hard work; local people don't participate
enough; etc. All of these observations are true and
must be addressed to improve Nepal's development
performance. But why these distortions occur and
whether there exists an underlying explanation of them
is not addressed. The approach is to reform the current
system. Karan and Ishii hint at the profound changes
which are needed, but hold back from specifying the
class structure and class interests which underlie the
behaviors they condemn. This choice may be strategic,
i.e., they believe that the fundamental changes in power
which are probably needed to implement their
recommendations will come slowly through reform.
The instrumental approach is also practical, since the
economists of the development establishment (World
Bank, USAID, Asian Development Bank, etc.) as well
as the power elite of Nepal are much more likely to
consider the ideas presented if they promote "reform"
rather than call for the overthrow of the country's ruling
class. If implemented, however, the reforms they
recommend will surely alter power relations in Nepal.
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The other two books more explicitly identify class
interest as it developed historically to explain the
failures of HMG to effect development. Dor Bahadur
Bista, in Fatalism and Development, sees class
interest as the ultimate cause of Nepal's inefficient
government, but his book attacks the cultural values,
instituted by the ruling class, as the immediate cause.
In fact he never examines the class base of the culture
and id~ology he abhors. Bista argues that a small elite
has used the ideology and cultural values of caste to
establish and maintain its position, and in the process
this cultural system and its ideology have corrupted
ordinary N epalis, even those groups which had
traditionally practiced "Hinduism without caste" and had
so~ial attributes which could be conducive to
development.
Caste or "Bahunism," he argues, presents karma as
an explanation of social position, thereby creati~g a
fatalistic attitude in its adherents so they do not beheve
they can or should act to alter their material
circumstances. Furthermore, caste divides people into
hierarchically organized groups in which those on top
guide the lower groups as their karmic right; one's
position in society is "ascribed", not earned by one's
talent and effort, and this causes power and success to
become divorced from a work ethic or "achievement
motivation." The division of society into exclusive
groups causes people to see the world in terms of their
own group, their afno manchhe.
The Ranas, to keep tabs on rival noble families,
demanded that each family have a prominent member
appear each day at court. From this practice, the
institution of chakari developed and spread to all those
seeking favors from persons in authority. Chaka~i
demands that individuals who want some favor wa1t
outside the residence or office of a decision maker for
days, weeks, or months until the petitioner's behavi~r
convinces the Big Man that the petitioner is one of h1s
afno manchhe; the big man then grants the favor, wi~h
the expectation that the petitioner will now do h1s
bidding. In the post-1951 era, the favor is often a job
in HMG's bureaucracy. Opportunity for advancement,
therefore, becomes tied to finding the "right" big man,
attending to him until he accepts the person as one of
his afno manchhe clients, and promoting the
advancement of his patron. Because the client's success
now hinges on that of his patron, he devotes himself to
discovering and alerting his patron to the plots of the
patron's rivals. These patron-client relations and
political jockeying become the "work" which all must
successfully complete, while actually doing one's job in
the government bureaucracy is unimportant. Hence,
Bista blames caste with its "fatalism" and chakari
patronage system for the inefficient administration
which dooms development.
In contrast to the caste culture and ideology of the
ruling elite which blocks development, the "indigenous
peoples" of Nepal, both the Tibeto Burmese peoples of
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central and eastern Nepal and the descendants of the
Khas of the far west, have social values which can
generate and sustain progress: a strong commitment to
productive labor, high capacity for endurance, efficient
cooperative organizational institutions, and a propensity
to adapt to change. Real development in Nepal,
therefore, can only come by eliminating with
indigenous values the poison of caste. For Bista caste
is foreign to Nepal. The Hinduism of the indigenous
peoples was shamanistic Shiva worship that did not
include hierarchy and divisions based on purity and
pollution. He maintains that to this day caste ideology
should not be identified with real castes because not all
Bahuns accept it, while other non-Bahuns, who have
recently joined the elite, embrace and promote it. Bista
writes that the poison of caste penetrated Nepal
somewhat during the Malia empire of the Karnali basin
and in the Lichavi and Mall a periods of Kathmandu, but
it was the Ranas who spread Bahunism throughout
Nepal and made it the dominant ideology. In contrast,
Prithvi Narayan Shah and his forebears ignored caste and
promoted equality between all groups.
In the post 1951 period, foreign aid has fit into and
perpetuated the system. "Fatalism is connected to
dependency, robbing the people of personal control, of
the sense of individual competence, and of their
willingness to assume responsibility, thereby
diminishing their motivation for personal
achievement... It substitutes instead the perception that
power and responsibility are qualities invested only in
powerful others and ... those powerful others are foreign
aid donors" (p .146). The dependency inherent in aid
threatens to create an "ingrained social and
psychological dependency" in the society, a syndrome of
being a "poor nation," which is incapable of caring for
itself. The aid also feeds the rampant corruption of the
system- itself the legacy of afno manchhe and chakari,
but because there is so much aid, the corruption has met
with little opposition. So many added facilities, like
schools, hospitals, roads, drinking water systems have
been built that "there is little for common people to
complain about (p.147)."
Bista also suggests that the predilection for religious
speculation and punditry induced by Bahunism has been
transformed in the development era into planning
exercises, arguments over development strategies, and
even radical politics. The continuity lies in the
precedence that discussion and argument take over
action. The seminar has become one of the most
successful modern innovations. "It allows people an
opportunity to demonstrate their erudition; ... the
activity is ... essentially a manipulation and play on
words; real decisions are not made and real actions not
taken (p.l38)." Even the radical political opposition is
dominated by punditry, espousing "abstract, utopian
philosophies, having little contact with the genuine
needs of the people and their culture (p.155)."
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The book's solution to Nepal's poverty is a
development strategy which opposes fatalism and
Nepal's domination by an hierarchic social order. The
transition to a different ideology need not be traumatic
"because the form of fatalism associated with the caste
hierarchy is not Nepali." Rather Nepal can draw on the
value systems of the traditional ethnic groups, both
Tibeto-Burman and Khas. There is no evidence that any
Rajput princes came into the Himalaya (p.37), but only
Brahman priests, fleeing the bloodthirsty Muslims who
were "systematically erasing all traces of Hinduism in
northern India (p.21)." These indigenous, non-caste, prePurana, Shiva-worshipping Hindus reputedly do value
hard work and have social systems in which cooperation
is integral. They created the trade items that
distinguished Nepal as a mercantile nation in the past.
In addition, the identity of individuals in these groups is
a collective identity, similar to the collective "self" of
East Asian nations, which have utilized social
cooperation as a basis for rapid economic growth.
Although most of these people are powerless, socially
oppressed, and disparaged, their values and ideals
represent a great resource (p.157). Bista declares the age
of "fatalistic hierarchism" over and insists that Nepal
must move rapidly to a new age based on cooperation,
and motivated by hard work and personal achievement.
How the Nepalese people will accomplish this new
era, unfortunately, is not addressed. Bista does,
however, see the continuation of the Shah dynasty as
essential. The King fulfills the "tendency for paternal
dependency" that all Nepalese share (p.162). The
monarchy provides a "beneficent paternal figure which
is reassuring to the Nepali and becomes the basis of his
developing sense of national identity (p.162)." The
King is father and the surrounding ethnic groups are
members of the national family:
Bista describes cogently the impact of fatalism and
hierarchy and the (mal)functioning of the post-1951
state apparatus, but many parts of his argument are
weak or troubling. First, some of his historical
interpretations seem questionable. Chief among these
is the treatment of the Shah dynasty: Professor Bista
goes to great lengths to separate the Shahs from the
imposition of caste values and Bahunism, but common
sense and recent scholarship suggest that major
continuities have linked the Shahs and Ranas (Whelpon,
1992). I would like more evidence that Prithvi Narayan
didn't promote caste than the observations of a foreign
visitor (Bista only cites Kirkpatrick, p.46) and the
king's official pronouncements. On that same page we
find an obvious, but I think revealing, error: "the
absence of fatalism and stratified hierarchy in the
Gandaki region facilitated Gorhka's successful
reunification of the country (emphasis added)." Bista
seems to assume that "Nepal" existed before the Shah
conquest, that there is some essential Nepal independent
of the state created by Prithvi Narayan.
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Second, the absence of any realistic suggestions
about what Nepalese citizens can do to transform the
malignant social system which besets them is
disturbing. In some unspecified way they are supposed
to replace caste values with those of the downtrodden
and disparaged. I think the reason for this lack is
connected to the next two: the failure to examine the
class basis of Nepalese society, and the deification of
the Shah dynasty.
The third, and most basic problem in my view is the
major unresolved issue of the book: Bista never
examines the relationship between culture/ ideology and
the class-based power which he admits underlies it. My
own position is that the way a society produces wealth
involves a class structure and a "logic" to which culture
and ideology conform, though not in a simple
deterministic way. If we have a certain mode of
production, we can expect a certain general social
structure. That is may be a debatable assumption, and
one which Bista would probably reject, though we can
only guess at his reaction. Early on he complains that
"a great majority of the critics like to focus on politicoeconomic aspects of society" and ignore the role of
"socio-cultural and religious values (p.8)." His book
emphasizes culture and ideology, but never returns to
address its class basis. If the social structure was
imposed by an elite, how can the society be altered
without changing the distribution of power?
My suspicion is that he avoids class because to do
so he must also examine the royal family. Throughout
the book, Professor Bista seeks to divorce the Shah
dynasty from the imposition of caste values, as noted
above. At the book's end he defends the King as the
benevolent father figure whose existence holds Nepal
together. The cynic may claim the book is a chakari
apology for continued royal domination, but I don't
think it is so simple. The erroneous claim that Prithvi
Narayan re-united Nepal invites speculation on Bista's
motivation: he is a Nepalese nationalist, devoted to his
country and its welfare. He seems to believe that a
Nepal exists independent of the monarchy and perhaps
by the 1990s it could; but, he also seems to believe that
the presence of the King is a practical necessity for
maintaining the country's integrity, and so Bista must
portray the Shahs as opposed to caste hierarchy, and
today's King as a beneficent father to his ethnic
children. However, the Shah monarchy and its control
over the Nepali state were based on expropriating the
surplus production and surplus labor of peasant farmers,
as Dr. Mahesh Regmi has shown so clearly (e.g. 1978a;
1978b). Prithvi Narayan's Nepal was a feudal society,
an example of the tributary mode of production (Wolfe,
1983), which of its essence is hierarchical and
exploitative. The caste justification of that hierarchy is
derivative, although as Professor Bista so clearly shows,
it acts to reproduce and intensify the hierarchy. Other
"tributary" societies also had social hierarchies with
similar patterns of "corruption," fictional political
struggles, and patron-client relationships. In the post-
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Rana period, the social structure has persisted, funded by
foreign aid, as the third book under review (Foreign
Aid, Poverty, and Stagnation) demonstrates. In
fact, the success of the pre-1951 elite in adjusting to the
new world of "development" and in using this new
source of surplus to maintain control belies Bista's
central claim that "fatalism" makes the high castes
unable to act effectively on the material plane. Bista's
neglect of the economic bases of Nepalese society
leaves me, at least, unsatisfied and ensures that he can
suggest no concrete plan to make the changes which he
so clearly shows Nepal needs.
The final book, Narayan Khadka's Foreign Aid,
Po-verty, and Stagnation in Nepal more directly
examines the society's power and class structure. This
large book, which is theoretically sophisticated and
empirically detailed, examines Nepal's economic change
since 1951 but focuses on how foreign aid funded those
changes. Khadka blames Nepal's dismal development
effort precisely on the failure to invest adequately in the
productive capacity of the country, especially in
agriculture. The reason for this is that foreign aid has
allowed the feudal elite to maintain control and to avoid
the changes needed. Without foreign aid the lack of
investment and low productivity of the tributary system
would have self-destructed and forced change. With
foreign aid, the "corruption," cronyism, and patronage
of Shah/Rana Nepal continues, thereby postponing the
needed changes.
Khadka's first chapter, the "Political Economy of
Poverty," critically discusses development theory,
questioning the orthodoxy that simple growth will
alleviate the poverty of the poor. It then provides a
statistically detailed description of Nepal's physical
environment, social resources, and economic and
political history. Chapter 2, "Foreign Aid and
Development," considers the theoretical and practical
goals of foreign aid, especially with regard to Nepal.
Chapter 3 is a detailed examination of what Khadka
calls the first phase of development 1951-1962. He
discusses the types and amounts of aid and the political
motivations of the major donors: the US, India, China,
and USSR.
Chapter 4 provides detailed information on the
sources and forms of foreign aid and on how they have
changed through the decades. The amount of aid has
increased spectacularly from Rs 53 million in 1956-57,
to Rs 66m in 1961, to Rs 1156m in 1985, to Rs
5088m in 1988, to an estimated Rs 6600m in 1990.
Prior to 1975, most aid came as grants and was bilateral
(93% and 66% respectively in 1975-6), though almost
all of it was "tied," i.e. had to be spent on products
made in the donor country. After the mid 1970s,
however, loans and multilateral donors (61% and 55%
in 1987-8) became increasingly dominant.
Chapter 5 reviews the sectoral allocation of foreign
aid. From 1951 to 1974-5, about 60% went to
transport and communications investments. In general,
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agriculture, the sector which engages 91% of the labor
force, was neglected, but it has been a high priority
since 1984. Land reform, which is needed to provide
families with productive assets, has also failed to a great
extent.
Industrial development remains tiny,
constituting only 5% of GDP by the late 1980s.
Chapter 6 reviews the burden of international debt.
Accumulated debt has become increasingly important
and totaled 30% of GDP by 1988, making Nepal
vulnerable to the "structural adjustment" demands of the
IMF. Per capita debt increased from Rs 4 in 1971 to
Rs 129 in 1980 and Rs 1122 in 1988.
Chapter 7, "Foreign Aid, Poverty, and Stagnation,"
evaluates the impact of aid. Chapter 8, "Findings and
Conclusions," summarizes the book. Overall aid has
hurt Nepal by allowing the feudal elite, through
"corruption," which is merely a continuation of the
accepted functioning of the pre-1951 system, to divert
the money into their pockets and maintain control. The
continuation of this old system insures that little
indigenous surplus or foreign aid is invested in ways
which increase the productivity of the economy, so
Nepal's economy has stagnated and its poverty
intensified.
The solutions Dr. Khadka suggests will be
extremely hard to implement, but complement those of
Karan and Ishii. First, he argues that Nepal must redefine development to mean the reduction of inequality
and the material improvement of the masses rather than
simple growth. Second, HMG must realistically assess
Nepal's natural, human, technological, and financial
resources in order to wean itself from dependence on
external resources. Third, Nepal must identify the
resource gaps that can only be met through external aid.
Fourth, the government must assess the socio-economic
and political costs of terminating aid. Fifth, HMG
must examine its operation to increase efficiency.
Sixth, the country must plan for the reduction and end
of foreign assistance by setting measurable performance
and temporal goals. Finally, Nepal must broaden the
political base of the government so that a wide range of
the people engage in planning, implementing, and
benefiting from development.
Hence, Khadka recommends the gradual end to
foreign aid and the initiation of institutional reforms to
make investments more effective. Land reform is
essential but not sufficient: the government must
promote programs which foster investment in the
agricultural production system to increase yields.
Interestingly, he does not blame foreign aid donors;
instead, while he critiques the motivations of the
various donor agencies, he still places the responsibility
for the failures in Nepal's development squarely on the
shoulders of the Nepalese elite.
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Taken together, these three books offer a tremendous
amount of information about Nepal and force the reader
to examine seriously the historical roots, geographical
impediments, and social failures which have produced
the current problems. What is interesting is that none
blames Nepal's condition on international forces, like
colonialism, the functioning of the international
economy, or the political and economic goals of the
foreign aid donors. They all agree that Nepal's power
structure, which controls the state apparatus and the
development process, has failed to utilize effectively the
resources at their disposal. They differ in their
explanations of why the government has performed so
poorly and in the relative importance they give to
Nepal's geographical constraints. Bista calls for cultural
change, but gives no concrete plan about how the
culture can be changed. Karan/Ishii and Khadka call for
reforms of the existing government apparatus to
improve the quality and execution of development
efforts. They also emphasize the need for including
environmental impact and popular participation as
integral to development planning. None of the books
calls for the conscious alteration of Nepal's power
structure, though the implementation of the
recommendations of Karan and Ishii and of Khadka
would inevitably produce such a change, e.g., both
books call for real land reform. My belief is that each
needs to examine more explicitly both the power
structure within Nepal and Nepal's role in the regional
and international political-economic order before they
can assess realistically the problems the country faces.
Without a fundamental shift in power, it seems highly
unlikely Nepalese society and government will change.
Without identifying the bases of that power, planning
for change will be impossible. What if power does
devolve to the poor majority, as both Karan and Ishii
and Khadka say it must? Will the aid donors or
neighboring countries tolerate the people-centered
policies that such a change implies? These are difficult
questions which none of these books address.
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